Fate – Q400 of the Royal New Zealand Navy –Renamed Dolphin and later Sayandra, wooden motor launch
After catching fire when off Green Island, on the west coast of Great Barrier Island on 9 March 1980, the Sayandra was badly damaged before the fire was put out by the crew of a passing yacht. Two launches then towed the Sayandra to Rarohara Bay, Port Fitzroy, and beached her near Quoin Island, where she sank next day. She became at total loss, subjected to vandalism and pilfering. In 1982, the Marine Division, Ministry of Transport, Auckland, took steps to have the partly submerged vessel removed.
Built at Auckland in 1942, the Sayandra was 34m long, 5.5m beam and powered by twin-screw diesel engines. Owned by Mr B.Pirret of Auckland.
The Sayandra was originally the Fairmile anti-submarine patrol launch Q400 of the Royal New Zealand Navy and had been severely damaged twice before, by fire and stranding in the Solomon Islands in 1944, and in February 1947 when struck by the bow of the Picton ferry Tamahine at Queen’s Wharf, Wellington.
Source: “New Zealand Shipwrecks 200 Years of Disasters at Sea” by Lynton Diggle, Edith Diggle and Keith Gordon. 2007.
News item –
SUB MENU
A U.S. Navy LCVP Landing Craft
(COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR)
The Manavex Incident
At the height of the Pacific war, a joint U.S.-New Zealand amphibious exercise turned tragic in the face of rain, wind, and heavy swells.
By Murray Dear
August 2023
Naval History Magazine
ARTICLE
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On 19 June 1943, the U.S. Navy transports Hunter Liggett (APA-14), American Legion (APA-17), Crescent City (APA-21), and George Clymer (APA-27), comprising Transport Division 8, sailed from Wellington Harbour, New Zealand, for an amphibious exercise at Paekakariki, on the west coast north of Cook Strait. The Royal New Zealand Navy antisubmarine escort (and control craft) for this exercise, codenamed “Manavex,” was made up of the auxiliary minesweeper HMNZS Rata, a converted coastal steamer, and the Fairmile motor launches ML400 and ML403. While the submarine risk was considered low, it is now known that three Japanese boats had previously passed through Cook Strait, the last being I-10 in mid February 1943.1
The landing force comprised elements of the 2nd Marine Division, then based at Mackays Crossing (now Queen Elizabeth Park) between Paekakariki and Paraparaumu. The objectives were to give experience in boat work and shore landing without any subsequent tasks ashore. Following the Division’s movement from Guadalcanal to New Zealand, it was deemed that the Marines needed to refresh their amphibious warfare skills. Once initial proficiency was obtained, full-scale opposed landings involving the live firing of machine guns and field artillery were planned to follow. Air support for the landings on 20 June was to be provided by four squadrons of the Royal New Zealand Air Force, with P-40 Kittyhawk fighters, Vickers Vincent light bombers, T-6 Harvard trainers, and Hawker Hind army cooperation aircraft.2
Everything went wrong with the exercise right from the start. The weather on 20 June was miserable, with cold rain and gale-force winds. There was a heavy swell, and the sea temperature was only 40degrees. The beach party from the American Legion was first away in LCVP (landing craft, vehicle, personnel) PA17-6, but this grounded 100 feet from shore. The beach at Paekakariki deepens gradually, and the tide was going out. When the beach party finally made it ashore, they “were cold, numb, wet and in a very foul mood.”3 Things only got worse as another 34 LCVPs ended up on the beach with propellers stuck in the sand. These 34 LCVPS eventually were returned to the water with the assistance of a local civilian contractor who provided bulldozers and other heavy equipment.
The beach party was the last to leave on the incoming tide, but by then the motor on LCVP PA17-6 was dead. Another LCVP attempted to tow the stricken landing craft, but the 1-inch line kept snapping with the heavy load. It was another two hours before an LCM (landing craft mechanized) arrived with an 8-inch hawser and proceeded to tow LCVP PA17-6 stern first back to the American Legion through waves 8 to 10 feet high. About 200 feet from shore, the LCVP was hit by a large breaker and the landing craft took on water. Attempts were made to signal the LCM to slow down, but these were not received. Some five to seven minutes after the tow commenced, LCVP PA17-6 capsized when hit by another breaker at 2317. It wasn’t until the LCM came alongside the American Legion with the upside-down LCVP still in tow (which immediately sank) that it was realised what had happened. The exercise was immediately canceled with a general alarm sounded for all available boats to be launched to search for survivors.
Chief Bosun’s Mate Mulcahy and Signalman Frank Zalot Jr. ended up in the water together, and as Zalot came up for a second time Mulcahy yelled, “Hang on, Zalot—we’ll make the beach.”4 All around them they could hear men screaming, “Help! Help! I can’t swim!”5 Mulcahy and Zalot struggled to get to shore, but the now-outgoing tide was too strong and they found themselves drifting out to sea. It wasn’t until midnight that Mulcahy and Zalot were rescued from the frigid water. Mulcahy was subsequently to be awarded a Presidential Unit Citation for saving Zalot’s life. Ten men were to drown that night: Ensign Herbert C. Winfrey, Boatswains Mate First Class Alva L. Skoog, Seamen First Class Howard J. Britton, Dale G. Cox, Joseph P. Lorbietski, William D. Roundtree, Kenneth G. Snow, Aiden P. Thatcher, Charles F. Vetter, and Walter J. Yanghis. The body of Seaman Thatcher was never recovered. On 8 May 2012, a memorial was unveiled at Queen Elizabeth Park to mark this tragedy. Among those who attended the ceremony was Frank Zalot Jr.
A board of inquiry subsequently was formed on board the American Legion to investigate the incident. The board chairman pressured Zalot to place all the blame on the lieutenant (junior grade) who had been the officer in charge of the beach party. Zalot insisted that the lieutenant was not responsible. The inquiry’s findings concluded that no one person in particular was responsible for the disaster; rather, it had just been a series of events where everything went wrong. One positive outcome from the inquiry was that, in the future, all members of a beach party had to wear life jackets while in the LCVP. In hindsight, the responsibility for the tragedy lies with the unknown officer who authorized “Manavex” in such poor weather and sea conditions.
After the exercise, U.S. Navy Captain G. B. Ashe wrote to the New Zealand Naval Board, “The Commander of Transport Division 8 reported that the new Zealand boats had performed in a most satisfactory manner—acted as control vessels for boat groups in several landing exercises, reacted correctly to changes in schedules, been prompt responding to signals and kept good positions on patrol—all indications of small, efficient, well-run and well-commanded ships.”6
Subsequent amphibious exercises were to be conducted in Hawke Bay on the more sheltered east coast of New Zealand’s North Island. And what was the point of these exercises? Exactly five months after “Manavex,” the 2nd Marine Division stormed ashore on a small island in the Central Pacific called Tarawa.
